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Guilhem Fabre
NOTE DE L’ÉDITEUR
Translated from the French original by Philip Liddell
1 Bertil Lintner, based in Bangkok since the 1980s for the Far Eastern Economic Review, has
established himself as a leading expert on the Golden Triangle, on the origins and the
repercussions of  the drugs traffic  in Burma and Thailand.  His  earlier books offered
brilliant contemporary accounts of how various states were making profitable use of
the criminal economy1. Having discovered in the course of his enquiries the full extent
of regional and international interaction in crime (whether organised or not), Lintner
decided to widen his analyses to East Asia and Oceania. Blood Brothers is the fruit of this
research over a five-year period, from 1997 to 2001. Having carried out a number of his
own  field  studies  across  the  Asia-Pacific  region,  and  being  supported  by  his  long
experience of  investigative journalism, Lintner has also taken full  advantage of  the
English-language literature  on the  subject—which makes  the  generous  bibliography
published at the end of the book a veritable tour de force. 
2 So Blood Brothers has fulfilled absolutely its own ambitions and is an essential source for
all those interested in the murky connections linking political and economic power at
the different levels of the criminal world. The first chapter, focusing on Shanghai of the
Opium War until its post-1949 recovery, is a fine illustration of this question which,
while  offering  nothing  new  for  the  expert,  will  provide  useful  instruction  for  the
layman.
3 By contrast, the second chapter is an innovative and up-to-date analysis of Macao’s role
as a platform for money-laundering, and of the links between this business and the
supervising  powers,  whether  colonial  or  mainland  Chinese.  By  placing  recent
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developments  within their  historical  context,  Lintner  enables  us  to  understand the
diplomatic skill of those real arbiters of local politics, the magnates Stanley Ho and
Henry Fok. Thus Macao, which is both a gambling den and a paradise for organised
crime, has made itself complementary to Hong Kong as an important financial base for
the “Triads” and their use by the Chinese state. The “Donorgate” scandal, during which
the Chinese administration attempted to influence the re-election of President Clinton
in 1996, implicated several Macao individuals, whose links with the Chinese authorities,
the “tycoons” and the underworld are here set out in detail. 
4 The  same  care  to  balance  the  most  recent  developments  with  their  historical
background is to be found in the following two chapters, devoted to Japan and Siberia.
In addition to an account of the now well-known connections between the Japanese
Yakuza and the financial and property bubble of the 1980s2, there are memorable pages
devoted to the career of  the ultranationalist  Sasakawa.  They recall  how in 1939 he
hailed Mussolini as “. . . a first-class person, a perfect fascist and dictator” and how
after the war he became a champion of the World Anti-Communist League, a billionaire
closely linked to the underworld, a sponsor of powerboat races and, via his foundation,
a generous donor to Harvard, Princeton, Oxford and many other universities.
5 Russia’s Far East, its history recalled through episodes in the Civil War and the Kolyma
camps, is brought up to date as an important base for the “Mafiya”. Lintner describes
how it exerts its control over the exploitation of natural resources, the economy and
local politics;  and how it  profits at the same time from the opening of the Chinese
frontiers, from its closeness to North Korea and its involvement in the drugs trade, and
from the local presence of the Yakuza, whose activities range from a lucrative sex-trade
to importing stolen cars.
6  Chapter 5,  devoted to the Indochinese Peninsula, reveals mainland China’s growing
control over local affairs, whether legal or illegal, with the expansion of mass tourism
and  illegal  immigration,  the  latter  particularly  coming  from  Cambodia.  Chapter  6,
entitled “The Pirate Republic”,  describes the links between Indonesia’s  underworld,
army  and  state,  going  back  to  the  colonial  period,  to  independence  and  to  the
massacres of 1965. This approach helps us to understand the role of the militia in East
Timor,  how  they  were mobilised  against  the  Chinese  community  at  the  time  of
Suharto’s  fall  in  1998  and  how  they  became  progressively  Islamicised  during  the
prolonged crisis of the regime. The disintegration of the licensed kleptocracy under
Suharto led, as it turned out, to the proliferation of decentralised criminal activities,
among which piracy,  illegal  migration to  Australia,  extortion and Islamic terrorism
were the most violent manifestations. 
7 Australia and the Pacific Islands have not been overlooked, as Chapter 7 demonstrates.
The rapid growth of migration from Vietnam, China and Lebanon has reinforced the
pragmatic collaboration between business, politics and the underworld. Moreover, the
Pacific  Islands,  lost  in the middle of the ocean,  have neither the resources nor the
political will to ban money-laundering. The examples of Vanuatu, which acquired for
itself the reputation of the “Caymans” of the Pacific, and Nauru, through which passed,
in 1998, 70 billion US dollars from Russian funds in flight from the taxman, illustrate
the extent of the money-laundering. The Island of Niue, an autonomous territory freely
associated  with  New  Zealand,  has  2,103  inhabitants  and  6,000  shelf  companies
accounting for 80% of the annual budget, the rest being provided by exporting sweet
potatoes  or  selling  Internet  domains  ending  in  the  “.nu”  country  code.  The  traffic
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extends  even,  as  in  Tonga,  to  consular  appointments  abroad,  much  appreciated  in
Chinese underworld circles when immunity is sought.
8 The last  chapter  is  given over  to  illegal  Chinese  immigration to  the  United States,
which is a particularly lucrative business backed up by powerful networks. But is it
right to conclude from that, as Bertil Lintner does, that “without the backing of the
criminal underworld on its side, it would be almost impossible for Peking to extend its
writ beyond its frontiers, and that is what makes the new nexus between the Triads and
China’s present leaders so dangerous for the rest of the world?” Certainly not. And the
writer goes further in the same vein, maintaining against all the evidence that “China
is,  even more than North Korea, a state that feels that it  has to engage in criminal
activities, such as drug running and the printing of counterfeit dollars to survive”.
9 This  mistaken perspective  illustrates  to  some extent  the  weakness  of  an  otherwise
remarkable  book,  which  accumulates  a  considerable  mass  of  facts  and  information
showing how organised crime has spread across Asia in the post-Cold War period. The
fact that the Chinese state may, as do most states, use the services of the international
underworld in its information and counterespionage activities does not mean that it is
dependant  upon  it.  Here  we  touch  upon  the  question:  what  is  the  real  impact  of
organised crime on present-day globalisation? Even if, in addition to the drugs trade,
the sex trade and gambling—the “traditional” activities—we take into account the new
markets  for  extortion,  plundering  of  natural  resources,  illegal  immigration  and
trafficking  of  all  other  imaginable  kinds,  the  influence  of  the  underworld  is  still
marginal compared with the official economy. Its investments, speculative as they are,
may play a role in some financial crises3 but its political influence, well established in
many  countries,  contrasts  with  its  relative  weakness  in  the  economic  sphere.  This
influence is exerted in numerous different ways, as Lintner shows. It can be reflected in
a real investment in forestry, as seems to be the case in Russia’s Far East. Or it can take
the  form  of  “functional”  synergies,  as  in  Thailand  or  Cambodia  where  business
communities are knowledgeable about the legal—as well  as the illegal—economy; in
Japan too the Yakuza influence derives from the fact that legal means of arbitration are
insufficiently developed and that their implicit arrangements with the political parties
are respected.
10 The case of  China (which from the domestic  and present-day point  of  view is  only
sketchily reported in Lintner’s book4) illustrates another variation, in which organised
crime can prosper on condition it stays in the shadow of the central power, that is to
say under its potentially repressive supervision, rather as in Mexico5. Macao is still the
perfect example of these developments.
11 An  extended  analysis  of  the  various  ways  and  means  by  which  criminal  networks
operate, taking Lintner’s rich book as a starting point, would be valuable. It would help
us  to  correct  any  errors  in  perspective  to  which  his  accumulated  evidence  of  the
growing impact of criminality might leave us exposed. Thus, Blood Brothers may claim to
mark a significant stage in our thinking on one of the negative aspects of globalisation:
it  calls  on  civil  society  to  counter  effectively  the  threats  posed  to  democracy  and
economic development.
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NOTES
1. Bertil Lintner’s books, such as The Rise and Fall of the Communist Party of Burma
(Cornell University, 1990), Burma in Revolt: Opium and Insurgency since 1948 (Silkworm
Books, Chiang Mai, 1991) are in the direct line of the pioneering analyses of Alfred W
McCoy (The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia, 1972; The Politics of Heroin: C.I.A. complicity in
the Global Drug Trade, 1991).
2. Cf. Guilhem Fabre, Criminal Prosperity: Drug Trafficking, Money Laundering and Financial
Crisis after the Cold War, RoutledgeCurzon, 2003. Chapter 5, “The Yakuza Recession”, has
been updated in a study published in the Far Eastern Economic Review, January 17th 2002.
3. Ibid.
4. Happily, the recently published work of Professor He Bingsong (You zuzhi fanzui
yanjiu [Research into organised crime], Peking, 2002, Zhongguo fazhi chubanshe) has
answered a good many questions in this field.
5. Cf. the studies by Christian Geffray on the relationship between the state and
criminal networks, in Globalisation, Drugs and Criminalisation: Final Research Report on
Brazil, China, India and Mexico, scientific direction: Christian Geffray, Michel Schiray,
Guilhem Fabre, UNESCO/UNDCP, 2002. Available on the website: http://
www.unesco.org/most/globalisation/drugs_1.htm 
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